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Making the best choice when faced with a chain of decisions requires a person to judge both anticipated outcomes and future actions.
Although economic decision-making models account for both risk and reward in single-choice contexts, there is a dearth of similar
knowledge about sequential choice. Classical utility-based models assume that decision-makers select and follow an optimal predeter-
mined strategy, regardless of the particular order in which options are presented. An alternative model involves continuously reevalu-
ating decision utilities, without prescribing a specific future set of choices. Here, using behavioral and functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) data, we studied human subjects in a sequential choice task and use these data to compare alternative decisionmodels of
valuation and strategy selection. We provide evidence that subjects adopt a model of reevaluating decision utilities, in which available
strategies are continuously updated and combined in assessing action values. We validate this model by using simultaneously acquired
fMRI data to show that sequential choice evokes a pattern of neural response consistent with a tracking of anticipated distribution of
future reward, as expected in such a model. Thus, brain activity evoked at each decision point reflects the expected mean, variance, and
skewness of possible payoffs, consistent with the idea that sequential choice evokes a prospective evaluation of both available strategies
and possible outcomes.
Introduction
Evaluating alternative actions is central to decision-making.
Many everyday situations require agents to generate a chain of
actions (a path through a decision-tree), leading to a distribution
of outcomes, which engenders uncertainty. This is a focus in
ecology, in which animals forage to ensure intake exceeds mini-
mal need constraints (Stephens et al., 2007), and in finance, in
which traders reap bonuses by exceeding a target return from
sequential transactions (Panageas and Westerfield, 2009). Com-
mon to these examples is that the distribution of possible out-
comes (energy,money) differs for each available series of choices.
Decision-making models in finance, psychology, and ecology
account for uncertainty (risk) and reward when valuing actions
(Markowitz, 1952; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Stephens and
Charnov, 1982). Growing neural evidence supports the idea that
key components of an outcome distribution, such as mean and
variance, are explicitly encoded in the brain. However, this liter-
ature focuses on immediate returns from single choices (Knutson
et al., 2005; Abler et al., 2006; Yacubian et al., 2006; Plassmann et
al., 2007; Elliott et al., 2008; De Martino et al., 2009), leaving a
relative dearth of knowledge about sequential choice.
In game theory and classical dynamic programming,
decision-makers’ strategies under every contingency are de-
scribed by a set of actions that maximize subjective value (“util-
ity”). In sequential choice, these utilities are called “continuation
values” because action values are contingent on following a fu-
ture strategy. Thus, in assigning continuation values, decision-
makers must make assumptions about what type of future
choices they will make. Standard dynamic programming con-
strains decision-makers to invoke only optimal choices in the
future [optimal continuation value (OCV)]. Critically, an opti-
mal strategy can be planned in advance, implying that “online”
updating is irrelevant or irrational (dynamically inconsistent) in
the absence of new information (Dekel et al., 1998; Epstein and
Schneider, 2003). AnOCV decision-maker, when presented with
decision 1 followed by decision 2, makes the same set of choices
even if the order is reversed (as long as no new information is
presented until after choices are made).
However, decision-makers can assign utilities to options
assuming that they might not take the optimal choice in the
future. This might occur if choices became unexpectedly con-
strained, when planned strategies would no longer be avail-
able. All available strategies (rather than just the preplanned
“optimal” strategy) are taken into account before each choice,
for example, by assuming that future choices are distributed
randomly [average continuation value (ACV)]. This entails
that strategies are dynamically reevaluated and action values
recalculated depending on which strategies are available. This
scenario allows for dynamic inconsistency, in which future
choices can depend on the order in which options are pre-
sented (Machina, 1989).
Received March 22, 2010; revised July 9, 2010; accepted July 13, 2010.
This work is supported by a Wellcome Trust Programme Grant (R.J.D.) and by the Swiss Finance Institute. We
thank NicholasWright, Rosalyn Moran, Dominic Bach, Deborah Talmi, and Steven Fleming for many helpful discus-
sions and Nikolaus Weiskopf for imaging advice.
Correspondence should be addressed to Dr. Mkael Symmonds, Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Insti-
tute of Neurology, University College London, 12 Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, UK. E-mail: m.symmonds@
fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk.
DOI:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1459-10.2010
Copyright © 2010 the authors 0270-6474/10/3014380-10$15.00/0
14380 • The Journal of Neuroscience, October 27, 2010 • 30(43):14380–14389
Thus, sequential decision-making poses two clear problems.
First, do humans evaluate the distribution of outcomes when plan-
ning choice? Second, do individuals assume optimal future choices
whenmaking sequential decisions?Here, we tested differentmodels
of strategy valuation and planning, simultaneously acquiring neural
data [using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)]. We
hypothesized that neural activity evoked in single-shot decision par-
adigms also supports decisionvariablesmediating sequential choice.
Materials andMethods
Behavioral experiment
The study was approved by the Institute of Neurology (University Col-
lege London, London, UK) Ethics Committee. Seventeen subjects (age
range, 22–36 years; seven male) participated; one dropped out from
scanning because of claustrophobia and was excluded from analysis.
Monetary earnings were between £18 and £28, including a fixed £10
participation fee. Stimuli were presented on a standard personal com-
puter using Cogent presentation software (Wellcome Trust Centre for
Neuroimaging, London, UK) run in MATLAB (version 6.5; Math-
Works). Choices were made by key-press selections on the computer
keyboard of a standard personal computer.
We provided instructions with a 15 min verbal tutorial, to ensure that
subjects understood the paradigm. In each block of the task, subjects
were required to make five sequential choices between a sure or risky
alternative. For each trial, a lottery was represented on screen using a
picture of four cards (Fig. 1), and subjects indicated by a button press
their choice to gamble or selection of a fixed sure amount of £2. Different
numbers on the cards (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) indicated monetary value in pounds.
We used five different card combinations, generating five lotteries with
matched expected value of £2 butwith different variance. All lotteries had
symmetrical outcome distributions (i.e., were unskewed), with a mean
return of £2. On each block, the same five lotteries were presented once,
using a randomized order of presentation, necessary if one is to detect
dynamically inconsistent choices. Critically, no feedback about out-
comes was given during the task. This con-
straint allowed us to focus on a situation in
which individuals do not need to adjust their
strategies in response to feedback, enabling us
to distinguish whether individuals adhere to a
predetermined strategy, regardless of the par-
ticular sequence in which the options are pre-
sented (consistent with classical dynamic
programming models in which choices are
made based on the optimal continuation
value), or whether they continuously reevalu-
ate, taking into account a range of available
strategies on each trial.
We altered the distribution of possible out-
comes and the relative utility of both the gamble
and sure optionby imposing financial targets (on
each block). At the beginning of each block, a
target appeared on the screen (four levels used
outside scanner: 5, 9, 11, 13; two levelsused inside
scanner: 7, 12). Subjects were told that 10 trials
would be randomly selected at the end of the ex-
periment from all sessions (inside and outside
scanner) inwhich all trials had an equal chanceof
being picked. For selected trials, if the required
target had been reached in that block, the out-
come of that trial would be paid out (i.e., 10 trials
are chosen to determine pay, contingent on
whether the target was reached at the end of each
block). This would be £2 if they had picked the
certain fixed amount orwhatever the outcomeof
the lottery (determined by a random selection of
one of the four cards), if they had chosen to gam-
ble. If the target had not been reached, then no
money would be won from the trial regardless of
choice.
Subjects were instructed to try to win as much money as possible,
remembering that the total amount won would depend on reaching the
target and whether they chose to gamble or not. Subjects were informed
that outcomes would be recorded for all their choices in the experiment
but that these would not be shown at the time. Subjects were not explic-
itly told that only five types of gamble would be shown. However, to
acquaint them with the task and to engender the idea that actual out-
comes were recorded from each choice made, five practice blocks using
identical gambles were run with full feedback.
Analysis. We initially categorized trials by two factors, current target
level and the variance (risk) of lottery presented. These datawere assessed
by ANOVA and multiple regression implemented in SPSS (SPSS for
Windows, release 12.0.1, 2001; SPSS Inc.). We then analyzed choices by
block. There are 25 32 possible combinations of choices in each block,
and we refer to each of these combinations or trajectories of choices as a
strategy, denoting strategy n as sn (n  1, . . ., N ). The frequency with
which each strategy was chosen was compared with simulated strategy
choice frequencies by 2 test.We simulated blockwise choice frequencies
using mechanistic binomial choice models (described below) and esti-
mated the best-fitting parameters of thesemodels using an application of
themethod of simulatedmoments (McFadden, 1989). This estimation is
based on comparing observed frequencies of choices with simulated fre-
quencies, derived from an underlying structural model. Free parameters
were optimized with a nonlinear simplex search algorithm in MATLAB
7.0. We selected the best-fitting model and assessed relative model per-
formances by a comparison of criterion values on an individual subject
basis.
Behavioral modeling. Our behavioral models have two components.
The first component provides a model of valuation, calculating an ex-
pected utility per strategy (Vn, n  1, . . ., N ) given the distribution of
outcomes a particular strategy generates. In other words, we apply a
utility function to each distribution of outcomes, to generate a single
number representing the subjective value of each strategy. The second
component models how future choice is incorporated, in which we im-
Figure 1. Task structure and timings. Trials were grouped into blocks of five. To commence each block, a financial target
appeared on the screen for 3.7 s (4 levels for behavioral experiment outside scanner: 5, 9, 11, 13; 2 levels inside scanner: 7, 12). A
fixation cross was shown at the beginning of each trial for 1–5 s (jittered). A lottery then appeared on the screen, and subjects had
up to 3.7 s to indicate by button press their choice (gamble or £2 for sure). Lotteries were represented by four red cards, with
numbers (0, 1, 2, 3, or 4) indicating monetary values in pounds, each with a probability of 0.25 of being selected. A computerized
random-number generatorwas used for selection; subjectswere shown the selected trial and block outcomes. Total earningswere
the summed total return from the 10 selected trials. ISI, Interstimulus interval.
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plement three separate continuation value models. These models specify
how strategies are compared and which strategies influence the value of
the current choice (to gamble or not to gamble). On the first trial in a
block, there are 16 possible strategies given a choice to gamble and 16
possible strategies given a choice of the sure amount. This reflects the fact
that there are five ordered binary choices between a lottery and a certain
payout, so 32 (25) possible sets of choices are available in any given block.
Each of these strategies has its own outcome distribution. Note that the
set of available strategies reduces as sequential choices are made such
that, by the fifth trial in a block, only two possible alternative strategies
are available (to gamble or opt for the sure outcome). In other words, the
set of possible strategies at any given trial is contingent on previous
choices in the block and the order in which the gamble options have been
presented.
Valuation model. We used a mean–variance–skewness (MVS) model
in which the distribution of outcomes is evaluated by a weighted linear
sum of its statistical moments. We assign values (utilities), Vs,t
h , to available
strategies s, on each trial t, for every target level h, and calculate utility given
the predicted distribution of outcomes resultant from each strategy s.
The set of strategies evaluated are contingent on previous choices in
each block. For example, on trial t  4, there will be four possible
available strategies to evaluate, given a certain sequence of simulated
or actual choices for trials t  1,2,3. Each of these strategies will
generate their own distribution of possible numerical outcomes. The
probability distribution of outcomes for each strategy will alter de-
pending on target level h.
Let Bn,t
h comprise the set of discrete outcomes given strategy sn on trial
t, where Bn,t
h ( j) indexes the jth outcome from this set, and Pj(Bn,t
h ( j))
indicates the probability of the jth outcome.
In this formulation, strategy value on trial t is specified as follows:
Vs,t  E(X)   Var(X)   Skw(X).
E(X) denotes the expected, (mean) value of the distribution of outcomes
from strategy sn:
EX EBn,t
h 
j
PjBn,t
h  j  Bn,t
h  j.
Var(X) denotes variance of outcomes:
VarX
j
PjBn,t
h  j  Bn,t
h  j EX2,
and Skw(X) denotes skewness of outcomes:
SkwX
j
PjBn,t
h  j  Bn,t
h  j EX3.
 is a coefficient reflecting aversion to variance in outcomes, and  re-
flects the degree of positive skew seeking behavior.Using a free parameter
for skewness allows modeling of a wide range of preferences (skewness is
a second-order approximation of risk), because this model accounts for
preferences for relative losses and gains independently of the spread of
outcomes.
We present the results using one valuation model (mean–variance–
skewness) in the main text. We also tested alternative utility models,
although these models are not directly statistically comparable because
they are non-nested with a different number of parameters (see supple-
mental data, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
We did not implement more complex variants of prospect theory with
differential weighting of relative losses and gains because anMVSmodel
incorporates some aspects of this behavior while being much easier to fit
(because it is linear in its arguments).
Continuation value models
To simulate choice, our continuation valuemodels perform a tree search
of all possible choice (action) and outcome (state) combinations from
current trial t to the end of each simulated block. This search is contin-
gent on (i.e., constrained by) previous choices. We recalculate the value
of available strategies on each trial, and, as the block proceeds, the num-
ber of possible strategies available reduces such that by trial t there will be
26t possible strategies remaining.
Optimal continuation value. This model assumes that agents pick the
choice combination (trajectory) of all possible alternatives that maxi-
mizes utility by the end of each block. In other words, the decision-maker
compares the current options on each trial (select the sure amount or to
gamble), and only the trajectories giving a predicted outcome distribu-
tion that maximizes utility determines choice. Thus, OCV prescribes the
choices for a prospective decision-maker who acts in accordance with
classical dynamic programming principles. Thus, in accordance with
standard dynamic programming models, OCV is oblivious to the order
in which options are presented.
We assign action values (Q) to the binary options gamble (specified as
Q 1) or sure (specified as Q 0), calculated on every trial, as the decision-
maker progresses through the decision tree. These two action values are
then compared with determine choice:
Q0 Vn , where n  arg maxn{Vn  sure choice},
Q 1  Vn , where n  arg maxn{Vn  gamble choice}.
n indexes the possible continuation trajectories (available strategies) or
branches of the decision tree.
Note that the OCV will remain the same on every trial within a block
when a subject adheres to the strategy selected at block outset. In the case
of a deviation from an optimal trajectory, the next best (utility maximiz-
ing) strategy is taken from the remaining options available. Importantly,
in the case of these deviations, the OCVmodel prescribes that appropri-
ate correction is taken based on always trying to follow the utility-
maximizing strategy.
Average continuation value. Thismodel entails that agents calculate the
average value or utility of each of the two alternative choices on each trial
(i.e., choosing to gamble or take the sure amount) rather than forecasting
with respect to optimal continuation trajectories. This model does not
require that agents have an explicit plan of future choices and is akin to a
model in which the current choice is made under an assumption that
choices are made randomly for the rest of the block. Every possible strat-
egy influences current continuation values. As such, the decision-maker
can be thought of as myopic:
Q0   1n n1
max n
Vn sure choice,
Q1   1n n1
max n
Vn gamble choice.
Sure continuation value. This model assumes that agents weigh up
the current choice against a benchmark of taking the sure option for
the remainder of the block. This implements a simple heuristic in
which the choice to gamble or take the sure amount is made given a
fixed benchmark:
Q 0  Vn , where n  {Vn  sure choice for T  t, . . ., 5},
Q 1  Vn , where n  {Vn  gamble choice for T, sure choice for
T  t  1, . . ., 5},
where t indexes the current trial (T) in the block (t 1, . . ., 5).
For a given target, several strategies can lead to similar distributions of
outcomes.However, strategieswill differ in their outcomes depending on
the target level. Moreover, a critical feature for all these decision rules is
that subjects’ previous choices within a block determine the remaining
available strategies to be evaluated. These models assume that the full
space of possible actions and outcomes is known. We make this simpli-
fying assumption to render model estimation tractable (i.e., specifically
we do not incorporate uncertainty about future options). This is not
unreasonable given that the task has a simple repeating structure with the
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same five lotteries being presented on each block throughout practice,
behavioral, and scanning sessions.
Numerical example. We provide a simple numerical example of how
these models work in practice (supplemental Fig. S1, available at www.
jneurosci.org as supplemental material). Imagine that you are faced with
a two-stage sequential decision between a gamble (g) and a sure amount
(s) of money, which is fixed at £2. The first decision (decision X) is
whether to accept a 50:50 gamble giving either £4 or £1. The second
decision (decision Y) is whether to accept a gamble giving a 75:25%
chance of winning £3 or £0, or again opting for a sure amount of £2.
There are four possible strategies to consider (ss, sg, gs, gg combinations,
which we refer to as strategies A, B, C, D), each giving a different distri-
bution of outcomes. In our models, these distributions are evaluated
according to a utility function (U), to give four separate numbers, or
utilities, one per strategy.
For example, we now assign numbers to these utilities for illustrative
purposes: U(ss)  10; U(sg)  8; U(gs)  4; U(gg)  7. Imagine now
having to choose a current action. In our model, if you were an optimal
decision-maker, you would compare the highest utilities given each
choice [in this case, U(ss) for a sure choice, U(gg) for a gamble choice].
Because U(ss)  U(sg)  U(gg)  U(gs), you prefer to make a sure
choice on the current trial. For the next decision, you again make a sure
choice, now comparing U(ss)  10 versus U(sg)  8. Thus, you have
selected strategy A. What if you are a decision-maker conforming to an
average continuation valuemodel? In this case, you weigh up the average
utility of outcomes from each current choice [i.e., you compare (U(ss)
U(sg))/2  9 with (U(gs)  U(gg))/2  5.5]. In this example, you also
prefer to make a sure choice [as U(s, )  U(g, )]. For the subsequent
decision, you compare U(ss) 10 and U(sg) 8 and again make a sure
choice, following strategy A.
Now let us consider a situation in which the order of decisions is
reversed (supplemental Fig. S2, available at www.jneurosci.org as supple-
mental material). There remain four strategies, but their order has
changed such that we have the following: U(ss) 10; U(sg) 4; U(gs)
8; U(gg) 7. If you are an optimal continuation value decision-maker,
you choose the sure option as U(ss)U(sg)U(gg)U(gs), followed
by another sure option [as U(ss)U(sg)]. The order has no effect on the
ranking of the strategies, and you make a dynamically consistent choice
by following strategy A again. If you are an average continuation value
decision-maker, you will compare (U(ss)U(sg))/2 7 with (U(gs)
U(gg))/2 7.5 and pick the gamble choice initially. On the next decision,
you make a sure choice, as U(gs)  U(gg), such that now you follow
strategy B and have made a dynamically inconsistent choice as the order
in which the options are presented has affected choices. A sure continu-
ation value (SCV) decision-maker wouldmake a consistent choice in this
example, in which the “sure, sure” strategy A has the highest utility but
also canmake dynamically inconsistent choices if this is not the case. The
actions actually selected (and whether they will be dynamically consis-
tent) will depend in practice on the specific utilities assigned to the avail-
able choices by the decision-maker. Note that, in these models, order
independence (dynamic consistency) only holds if there is no new infor-
mation arriving, which is the case in this experiment in which no trial-
by-trial feedback is given, also that thesemodels reflect differentmethods
of valuation and planning (i.e., an anticipated selection of choices) rather
than testing execution of a preformed plan (i.e., self-consistency).
Action selection.We account for randomness in choice by the addition
of noise at action selection (modeled by a logistic choice function). Thus,
the predicted probability of choosing to gamble on a given trial is given by
the following:
Pgamble choice
1
1 e
1

Q1Q0
,
where  is a free parameter.
Model estimation.We based our model estimation on a comparison of
the observed frequencies of block-by-block choices (i.e., strategies) with
simulated frequencies, derived from each of the underlying structural
models outlined above. The models generate a choice per trial per simu-
lated block (using the probabilistic action selection rule), fromwhich we
calculate the simulated frequency () with which each strategy is chosen.
We ran 1200 simulated blocks per model, across all six target levels, with
a randomized trial order per block. These simulated frequencies are then
compared with actual observed choices (z), using the method of simu-
lated moments (McFadden, 1989). z(i) is a vector of choices over avail-
able strategies on block i, with its elements taking the value 1 for the
chosen strategy and 0 otherwise:
yi  z(i)  	,
D  min


 1Ni1
N
yi	 
1 1Ni1
N
yi,
where yi is a vector of observations from one block i (observed simu-
lated frequencies),
 is a weightingmatrix, andD, the criterion function,
is theweighted sum-of-squares difference between the observed and sim-
ulated frequencies across all blocks (i  1, . . ., N ). Optimization of D
(which finds the best-fitting set of parameters 
) is performed in a two-
step procedure. Initial unweighted estimates are derived with 
  I
(identity matrix). A weighted optimization is then performed. To esti-
mate the precision of the observations, we calculate the covariance ma-
trix (
) of the differences between simulated and observed frequencies
that come out of an unweighted optimization:

 
1
Ni1
N  yi  1Ni1
N
yi  yi  1Ni1
N
yi	.
To make 
 invertible, it is necessary to aggregate unchosen strategies,
otherwise the weightingmatrix is rank deficient. The estimated precision
is then the inverse of this covariance matrix (
1). We weight observa-
tions according to this precision in performing the weighted optimiza-
tion to calculate an unbiased estimator. This method of moments
criterion functionD is not differentiable in the parameters (there are step
changes in the value of the function as the parameters vary); hence, we
use a simplex search method to optimize the parameters with respect to
the criterion function D (by using the Nelder–Mead simplex algorithm
implemented in MATLAB). We use the method of simulated moments
to optimize the models because the problem of multinomial sequential
choice is high dimensional and computationally difficult to integrate.
Thismeans that we cannot use Bayesianmethods to get ameasure such as
the Bayesian information criterion. In these circumstances, the method
of simulated moments provides a robust way of optimizing models, and
the criterion function acts as a likelihood estimate that allows compari-
son of our model space.
The optimized criterion valueD is a directmeasure of the residual sum
of squared error of each model. D (multiplied by the number of obser-
vations) is  2 distributed (Hansen’s J statistic) (Hansen, 1982). Relative
model likelihoods calculated from  2 statistics are not comparable for
non-nested models. However, to the extent that the number of parame-
ters are equal (for a given utility and noisy choicemodel), criterion values
can be directly compared. Hence, inverse criterion values (D1), reflect-
ing relative goodness-of-fit, were directly compared for best-fittingmod-
els on an individual subject basis. All expected utility and prospect theory
models have two free parameters ( and ), whereas MVS models have
three free parameters (, , and ).
Functional MRI
All subjects had previously completed the behavioral experiment and
understood that the task structure and presented lotteries were identical.
We used two target levels during scanning (7 and 12). Visual cues were
projected onto a screen, visible via an angledmirrormounted on theMRI
head coil. Choices were indicated by pressing a button box with the right
index finger, and responses were recorded using Cogent presentation
software.
Scanning parameters.We acquired gradient echo T2*-weighted echo-
planar images (EPI) with blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) con-
trast, on a 3 T head scanner (Magnetom Allegra; Siemens Medical).
Imaging parameters were as follows: 48 oblique transverse slices; slice
thickness, 2 mm; gap between slices, 1 mm; repetition time, 3.1 s; echo
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time (TE), 30 ms; field of view, 192  192 mm2. We used an EPI se-
quence that optimized for BOLD sensitivity in the orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC) using a combination of an increased spatial resolution in the
readout direction and a reduced echo time (Weiskopf et al., 2007). To-
gether with the oblique orientation of the slice acquisition, this can com-
pensate and recover for potential signal loss inOFC, one of our regions of
interest. During the same experimental session, a T1-weighted imagewas
obtained for anatomical reference. To correct for geometric distor-
tions induced in the EPIs at high field strength, we collected field
maps based on dual echo-time images (TE1, 29 ms; TE2, 19 ms) and
processed these using the statistical parametric mapping SPM5 field-
map toolbox (Hutton et al., 2002) to produce a voxel displacement
map indicating the field distortions.
Images were realigned with the first volume, normalized to a standard
EPI template, and smoothed using an 8mm full-width at half-maximum
Gaussian kernel. Unwarping was performed using the routine in SPM5,
correcting for distortions in each acquired image by combining themea-
sured field maps with estimated susceptibility-induced changes attribut-
able motion. Realignment parameters were inspected visually to identify
any potential subjects with excessive head movement. Data were ana-
lyzed in an event-related manner using a general linear model, with the
onsets of each stimulus modeled as a  function. To capture all variance
of interest (i.e., the modulation of neural response preceding each
choice),  functions were placed halfway between the onset of the pre-
sentation screen and the subsequent key-press response. Regressors of
interest (see Results) were generated by convolving the stimulus func-
tions with a hemodynamic response function. First-order temporal de-
rivatives of each of these convolved functions were included to ensure
that any neural activity related to cognitive processes of interest within an
approximately2s window period should be captured by the convolved
 functions placed at the halfway point (Friston et al., 1998). This also
avoids the need to constrain the model by making predictions concern-
ing the timing of the neural responses to the different regressors.
Our contrasts of interest purely concern responses parametrically
modulated by specific stimulus dimensions, reflecting activity indepen-
dent of the regressors modeling nonspecific responses to stimulus pre-
sentation. Covariates of no interest comprised the onsets of the target
screens and subject-specific realignment parameters from the image pre-
processing to account formotion-related artifacts in the images that were
not eliminated in rigid-bodymotion correction. BOLD data from blocks
in which a response had been missed were factored out by explicitly
including a regressor for these error trials. All data were analyzed using
statistical parametric mapping software (SPM5; Wellcome Trust Centre
for Neuroimaging). Trial-type-specific  values of linear contrasts were
estimated, and these were entered into t tests using random-effects anal-
ysis to provide group statistics.
Presentation of data and images. Figures are constructed by threshold-
ing second-level SPM t images at p 0.005, and superimposing data on
a mean image across all participants. Stereotactic coordinates are re-
ported in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space (Mazziotta,
2001). For the contrasts of interest, results are reported at a threshold of
p 0.001 uncorrected.We also report results with small-volume correc-
tion for regions of interest dictated by previous studies at p  0.05 (a 6
mm radius sphere centered on a priori coordinates) (for details, see
supplemental Tables S6, S7, available at www.jneurosci.org as supple-
mental material).
Results
Behavioral
Trial-by-trial choices
We first analyzed subjects’ choices in terms of a decision to gam-
ble or opt for the sure amount, on a trial-by-trial basis, across all
sessions (inside and outside scanner). We observed a linear rela-
tionship between risk (variance) of an individual gamble and the
percentage of time that subjects chose the gamble over the sure
alternative (Fig. 2). A repeated-measures ANOVA demonstrated
a significant main effect of both riskiness of each gamble
[F(2.86,42.95) 2.88, p 0.049 (Greenhouse–Geisser corrected de-
grees of freedom,   0.72); Mauchly’s test for sphericity: (9)
2 
19.49, p 0.05] and target level [F(5,75) 16.32, p 0.001 (within-
subjects contrasts; negative linear effect of risk: F(1,15) 9.64, p
0.007, r 0.63; linear effect of target: F(1,15) 42.37, p 0.001,
r  0.86)] (Fig. 2). There was also a significant interaction be-
tween risk and target level (F(20,300) 2.72, p 0.001] such that,
at higher target levels, the slope of the linear relationship was
reduced. There was no tendency for subjects to be more risk
seeking at the beginning or end of the blocks, with neither a linear
nor quadratic effect of time point within a block on the probabil-
ity of choosing to gamble (risk  target level  time ANOVA;
linear contrast:   0.023, r2  0.001, p  0.679; quadratic
contrast: p 0.42).
Analysis of choices by block
Descriptively, subjects switched strategy in a systematic manner
as the target level changed (Fig. 3). For low target, subjects tended
to choose strategies involving fewer lottery gambles. However,
for higher targets, as the chance of getting nothing increased,
subjects chose strategies involving more lottery gambles, thereby
increasing expected return. Therewas considerable heterogeneity
in strategy selection, particularly for medium target levels. Ana-
lyzing group data across all subjects demonstrated that choices
were significantly different from random (2 test against random
choice, df 155, p 0.001).
A comparison of each of the decision-making models is illus-
trated in Figure 4A (for details of modeling analysis and alterna-
tive utility models, see Materials and Methods and supplemental
text available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material). In
absolute terms, a model of average continuation value obtained
the lowest optimized weighted criterion value, or difference be-
tween predicted and actual choice frequencies (ACV: mean 
SEM, D 6.3 1.5; OCV: mean SEM, D 11.9 3.0; SCV:
mean SEM, D 29.5 7.4). We also compared models with
random choice (in which all strategies are selected with equal
frequency) to give an absolute measure of accuracy. A random
Figure 2. Analysis of trial-by-trial choices. Graph showing the proportion of time that the
gamble option was selected overall, for each of the five presented lotteries [abscissa is the
variance of each individual lottery in (pounds)2]. Data plotted for both choices in the behavioral
experiment outside the scanner (solid lines: using target amounts £5, £9, £11, £13) and choice
made inside the scanner (dashed lines: using target amounts £7, £12). Error bars show SE (n
16). The proportion of gamble choices linearly decreased with increasing risk of each lottery,
demonstrating increasing risk aversion ( p 0.049). There was also a significant linear inter-
action between the risk of each presented lottery and the target level ( p 0.007).
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model obtains a mean criterion value of 78.3. The average dis-
tance (i.e., summed least-squares error) between the array of ob-
served frequencies and the array of model-simulated frequencies
is 6.3 for ACV and 78.3 for the random model. Therefore, the
summed least-squares error for ACV is 92% less than is the case
for the random model. According to the ACV model, all 16 sub-
jects were averse to variance (variance coefficient  SD, 0.21 
0.03) and were positive skew seeking (skewness coefficient SD,
1.2  103  0.6  103). The value of the  parameter (tem-
perature parameter of the softmax/logistic function used to ac-
count for noisy choice) were low (average SD , 0.31 0.62).
This indicates that the valuation model performs well at explain-
ing choice without modeling a large degree of additional ran-
domness in action selection. It is important to note that, although
on average the ACVmodel was superior, there was heterogeneity
in the best-fitting model on a subject-by-subject basis (Fig. 4B).
The ACV model was superior to the SCV model in 13 of 16
subjects (Fig. 4C). Both parametric and nonparametric tests of
the criterion value statistics at the group level revealed that ACV
obtained a significantly better fit than SCV (paired t test, p 
0.001; binomial test, p  0.002) but was indistinguishable from
OCV on these behavioral data alone (paired t test, p  0.294;
binomial test, p 0.402).
Functional imaging
We analyzed fMRI data, initially using the average continuation
value model. A linear utility model is akin to the general linear
model used in fMRI analysis, enabling us to decompose neural
activity according to the effect of three statistical moments of the
outcome distribution (mean, variance, and skewness). For the
design matrix, we parametrically modulated the magnitude of
the neural response on every trial with four regressors indicating
target level (high or low), expected value, variance, and skewness
of the outcome distribution, respectively. The use of parametric
modulators tomodel the neural response to complex stimuli with
several dimensions is well established (Bu¨chel et al., 1998; Wood
et al., 2008), and the correlation of neural data with dynamically
changing internal variables of a computational model has been
implemented in several studies of the neural valuation system
(O’Doherty et al., 2004; Samejima et al., 2005) (for review, see
Corrado and Doya, 2007). We first include the target level to
account for evoked activity differences solely attributable to
changes in effort or concentration evoked by a difference between
a low and high target and activity attributable to explicit tracking
of the target or context. In addition, this removes correlations
between the regressors induced by the fact that, at high targets,
the expected value is naturally always low and the skewness is
always positive (high chance of failing to reach target and receiv-
ing nothing).
We then performed a directed stepwise linear regression to
analyze the contribution of each variable in turn to the BOLD
signal, by sequentially orthogonalizing regressors. Because we
had strong a priori regions of interest, derived from previous
studies of single-shot decision-making for expected value and to
a lesser extent variance and no a priori knowledge about skew-
ness, we orthogonalized the regressors in this specific order.
Thus, we first account for asmuch neural activity as possible with
the expected value regressor, then explain residual activity with
the variance regressor, and finally explain activity with the skew-
ness regressor. Any residual activity correlating with skewness is
therefore independent of expected value and variance. In addi-
tion, orthogonalization is necessary because correlations remain
between the statistical moments even having accounted for gross
differences attributable to the target level (correlation coeffi-
cients: expected value vs variance, 0.57; expected value vs skew-
ness, 0.50; variance vs skewness, 0.01). It is important to note that
including the target regressor changes our inference about activ-
ity tracking the predicted outcome statistics: we analyze activity
tracking the conditional moments (i.e., expected value, variance,
and skewness changes with respect to the current target level)
rather than the raw unconditional statistics. This analysis con-
ditional on current target is similar to previous studies inves-
tigating the tracking of value in different frames or conditions
(DeMartino et al., 2006, 2009; Elliott et al., 2008; Plassmann et
al., 2008) and asks whether expected outcomes are encoded
relative to context.
A key idea in this neural analysis is the principle of using
neurophysiological data to arbitrate betweenmodels of decision-
making that are difficult to distinguish using choice data alone. If
future trials were not considered at all (i.e., participants were
oblivious to the task structure and the need to attain a target) and
instead if each lottery is compared with the sure amount in iso-
lation, we would not expect to observe neural signals correlating
with expected value or skewness (because all gambles were sym-
metric and had the same expected value) i.e., the null hypothesis.
This hypothesis in itself is fairly trivial to refute using just behav-
ioral data, because clearly our participants’ choices are sensitive
to the target level. Conversely, if individuals anticipate future
outcomes in a strategic manner (using either of the two most
likely strategies according to choice data, of OCV in which a
specific set of choices are weighted, or ACV in which all possible
future choices are weighted), the presence of such correlated sig-
nals can be interpreted as providing evidence that such strategies
are taken into account and that the observed pattern of neural
response tracks the anticipated distribution of outcomes (specif-
Figure 3. Choice strategies for different target levels, 16 subjects. Bar plot of frequencies
withwhichdifferent choice combinations (i.e., strategies)were chosen, for eachof the six target
levels used. Choice strategy on x-axis, numbered from1 to 32 according to the 2 5 32possible
combinations of five sequential binary choices to gamble or not gamble. Choice strategies
sortedby increasingnumberof times agamble is chosen (i.e., combination1 inwhichall choices
opt for sure amount, and combination 32 in which all choices opt for the gamble). Six target
levels on y-axis. Choice frequency (i.e., number of blocks in which the specific choice combina-
tion occurred, divided by total number of blocks) on z-axis. Blockwise data are aggregated
across all 16 subjects for illustration.Model fittingwas performed on a subject-by-subject basis.
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ically in brain regions previously impli-
cated in representing statistical moments
of choice in single choice paradigms). We
aim to discriminate specifically between
OCV and ACV models using neural
data, given that these models were indis-
tinguishable solely from our behavioral
analysis of sequential choice. We use the
fact that these models predict different
anticipated outcome distributions on a
trial-by-trial basis, together with fine-
grained neural signal changes (as op-
posed to categorical choice data), to give
additional power to arbitrate between
models.
Average continuation value model
Fluctuations in expected value for each
choice correlated with activity in right
medial OFC (mOFC) (MNI coordinates:
6, 50, 14; t  4.16, p  0.032, small-
volume corrected for region of interest)
and nucleus accumbens (MNI coordi-
nates: right nucleus accumbens, 4, 10,6;
t  3.74, p  0.036, small-volume cor-
rected for regions of interest). In other
words, activity in these regions tracked the
orthogonalized component of expected
value (meaning the error in a projection
of expected value onto target level), ac-
cording to ourmodel of online tracking of
outcome distributions. Note that this re-
gressor is linearly independent of that
tracking the target level (supplemental
Table S1, available at www.jneurosci.org
as supplemental material) (Fig. 5B). The
target regressor itself correlated with ac-
tivity in areas including right middle frontal gyrus (MNI coordi-
nates: 46, 2, 54; t  5.76, p  0.001 uncorrected), anterior
cingulate cortex (MNI coordinates: 6, 44, 14; t 5.08, p 0.001
uncorrected), and paracentral lobule/supplementary motor area
(MNI coordinates;6,24, 56; t 4.66, p 0.001 uncorrected)
(supplemental Table S2, available at www.jneurosci.org as
supplemental material) (Fig. 5A). We also tested the alterna-
tive ACV model that did not explicitly model the target sepa-
rately (i.e., we ask whether there is BOLD signal that correlates
with the unconditional statistics of the outcome distribution,
not adapted to target level). In this model, no brain activity
positively correlated with the overall expected value of a
choice, even at a liberal threshold of p  0.005 uncorrected
significance.
We next examined neural activity accountable by changes
in the average variance of possible future outcomes given each
choice, having accounted for activity attributable to target and
expected value. The orthogonalized component of variance-
related activity correlated with BOLD in anterior insula [MNI
coordinates: right anterior insula, 40, 20,6; t 3.64, p 0.028
small-volume corrected for regions of interest (supplemental
data, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental mate-
rial); left anterior insula, 38, 20, 4; t  3.84, p  0.001
uncorrected)], right putamen (MNI coordinates: 26, 28, 8;
t 6.42, p 0.001 uncorrected), and right anterior cingulate
cortex (MNI coordinates: 8, 44, 16; p  0.001 uncorrected)
(supplemental Table S3, available at www.jneurosci.org as
supplemental material) (Fig. 5C).
Having accounted for neural activity attributable to target,
expected value, and variance of anticipated outcomes, we next
sought to explain residual activity in terms of the (orthogonalized
component of) skewness of the expected outcome distribution
(calculated as the expected cubed deviations from expected out-
comes).We observed activity correlatingwith skewness inmedial
frontal pole, left superior parietal cortex and postcentral gyrus,
and left inferior frontal gyrus ( p 0.001 uncorrected) (supple-
mental Table S4, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental
material) (Fig. 5D).
As an additional analysis, we estimated a separate general lin-
ear model in which we modeled neural responses covarying with
subject-specific expected utility on a trial-by-trial basis, calcu-
lated according to the behavioral parameters estimated from sub-
jects’ parameters from the ACVmodel. Asmight be expected, the
largest cluster of significant activity correlating with expected
utility was found in medial prefrontal cortex (peak voxel MNI
coordinates: 8, 56, 2; t  3.87; extent  66 voxels) (supple-
mental Table S5, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental
material).
Optimal continuation value model
Given that the OCV model was statistically indistinguishable
from ACV on the behavioral data alone, we implemented an
analysis based onpredictions from the alternativeOCVmodel for
Figure 4. A, Comparison ofmodels I. Therewere three types of continuation valuemodel, indicating different decision-making
processes: optimal, inwhichonly the relativeoptimal outcomes (of gamblingornotgamblingoneach trial) are evaluated; average,
inwhich the relative average of possible outcomes are evaluated (so all possible choice trajectories considered); and sure, inwhich
the choice to gamble is evaluated with respect to the alternative of taking the sure option for the remainder of the block. To
illustrate the relative superiority of the differentmodels, we plot the inverse of the average criterion function [(meanD)1, where
D is the criterion value (the distance between simulated and actual choice frequencies)]. Larger values for D1 indicate a better
model fit. B, C, Comparison of models II. For each subject (n 16), the criterion value, D, from the mean–variance–skewness,
average continuation value model, is compared with the optimal continuation value and sure continuation value models. Points
above the red line indicate that themean variance skewnessmodelwith average continuation value provides the better fit. Values
are plotted on logarithmic axis for illustration; the red line indicates equality betweenmodels. The ACVmodel and OCVmodel are
comparable in their behavioral fits across subjects. The ACVmodel outperforms the SCVmodel for most subjects (C). We also plot
the residual values (differences) in D1 per subject in the bottom corner.
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each subject, to investigate whether neural activity correlated
with the internal parameters of this model. In essence, we are
asking whether brain activity can adjudicate betweenmodels.We
formulated the fMRI designmatrix in an identical manner, mod-
eling activity as a series of spike events, with their heights modu-
lated by parametric regressors corresponding to target level,
expected value, variance, and skewness of the outcome distribu-
tion under a set optimal strategy but contingent on previous
decisions in a block. As above, inferences were made at the group
level. There was no significant activity in a priori regions of inter-
est correlating with the regressors tracking the outcome distribu-
tion, at a threshold of p  0.001 uncorrected significance. For
completeness, we tested the alternative OCVmodel not explicitly
modeling the target separately and also found that no brain ac-
tivity positively correlated with the overall expected value of a
choice (at p  0.005 uncorrected). This suggests that neural ac-
tivity in brain regions previously associated with economic
decision-making is better captured by an ACV model, with on-
line trial-by-trial updating rather than the OCV model with a
fixed pre-set strategy.
Discussion
We first asked how humans evaluate outcome distributions from
different strategies in a sequential choice task. Using a mean–
variance–skewness model, we find that our subjects are variance
averse and positive-skew seeking. Positive-skew-seeking mani-
fests when participants excessively opt for the sure rather than
risky option even with low targets (in which the chance of failing
to reach the target is small). This implies an attraction of small
chances of above-average outcomes and dislike of small-
probability below-average outcomes. In effect, we observe a pref-
erence for relative gains over losses, similar to prospect theory.
fMRI data revealed brain activity correlating with the statisti-
cal moments of a distribution of outcomes in prototypical valu-
ation and risk-sensitive areas. Previous studies of risky decisions
have segregated risk and value-related activity in regions such as
cingulate and insula cortices (risk) and ventral striatal andmedial
orbitofrontal areas (valuation) (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Lee,
2005; Huettel et al., 2006; Rangel et al., 2008). Finding separable
areas of brain activity parametrically varying with mean, vari-
ance, and skewness supports predictions from an MVS model,
but we cannot rule out alternative neural implementations of
subjective utility. It is possible that the variance-related activity
we see may reflect downstream emotional or physiological re-
sponses consequential on detecting increased risk rather than
direct risk-assessment itself. For example, the insula supports
introceptive processing, and activity we observe could be ex-
plained either as risk representation or as an arousal response
consequent on the perception of risk (Critchley et al., 2004).
However, a parametric response to risk in these regions is less
easily explained as an arousal response unless one invokes a
monotonic relationship between risk and arousal.
Our finding that expected value correlates with activity in
mOFC supports an hypothesis that mOFC integrates overall
value given a predicted distribution of outcomes. In our task
these variables related to a distribution of outcomes not from a
single choice but from a set of serial choices, forecast to the end of
each block. This corroborates a suggestion that neural response
to value invokes an integrated, goal-directed, representation of
choice (Quintana and Fuster, 1999; Fincham et al., 2002).
Our analysis includes a regressor accounting for the target
(high/low), controlling for target-induced changes in attention,
concentration, or effort, andmeans that OFC responses track the
moments of the outcome distribution conditional on target level.
In effect, the mOFC BOLD signal tracks relative rather than ab-
solute changes in expected value (because we did not see similar
activity without controlling for target level). This suggests adap-
tive value encoding, similar to findings from direct neuronal re-
cordings in monkeys in which a proportion of OFC neurons
adapt to condition, manifesting similar ranges of response under
different scales of outcomes (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2008;
Padoa-Schioppa, 2009; Kobayashi et al., 2010). This adaptation
potentially can overcome the limited dynamic range of neuronal
Figure 5. Responses to target level, expected value, variance, and skewness.A, Main effect of target level. SMA, Supplementarymotor area; ACC, anterior cingulated cortex; SFG, superior frontal
gyrus.B,Main effect of parametric response to expected value givenbyACVmodel.mVS/NAcc,Medial ventral striatum/nucleus accumbens; VmOFC, ventromedial orbitofrontal cortex.C, Parametric
response to expected variance (risk) of each choice. PUT, Putamen; AINS, anterior insula. D, Parametric response increasing with (positive) skewness in medial frontal pole. SPM t thresholded at
p 0.005 superimposed on a canonical structural template. Color bars show t value scales for voxel color maps.
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signaling, implying that responses to expected value are inte-
grated with information about the target in generating action
values.
We also identify a skewness response, comprising medial pre-
frontal and superior parietal cortex, also shown to reflect subjec-
tive value in tasks with stochastic outcomes (Peters and Bu¨chel,
2009). It is unlikely that this simply reflects cognitive demand or
planning, because we see a parametric response even having sep-
arately accounted for the target level.We detect a signal reflecting
expected utility of each choice (incorporating the target, relative
expected value, and risk), calculated as the subject-specific com-
bination of these statisticalmoments, inmedial prefrontal cortex.
This locus of activity overlaps with areas in which activity corre-
lates with subjective utility (Daw et al., 2006). However, compu-
tations for sequential decision-making, in which outcomes are
stochastic and forecast several trials into the future, are repre-
sented in a more anterior location to that found when decision
utilities represent deterministic outcomes from single-shot
choices (Plassmann et al., 2007).
Our second question related to how individuals account for
their possible future choices when selecting actions. Behaviorally,
we found individuals reevaluate on each trial (ACV) rather than
comparing choices with the risk-free alternative (SCV). Further-
more, neural activity distinguished between behaviorally equiva-
lent OCV and ACV models, with correlations of key variables
from the latter rather than the former. However, classical dy-
namic programming models are based on OCV, in which
decision-makers assume a specific optimal series of future
planned choices. These models insist on dynamic consistency
(choices are independent of the order in which options are pre-
sented) and have been used to describe choice in computational
(Sutton and Barto, 1998), ecological (Houston et al., 1988), and
economic (Samuelson, 1969) settings. ACV implies that potential
outcomes from a number of strategies influence current choice in
the decision-making process (because ACV decision-makers as-
sume future choices are made randomly).
The likelihood that decision-makers represent or weight out-
comes of alternative strategies relates to the possibility that future
actionsmay deviate froman optimal trajectory. This can be either
intentional (as a result of exploration or future constraints on
available choices) or by accident (lapses or mistakes). In reality,
we are unlikely to follow a predetermined path in our strategic
decisions. If we ignored alternative outcomes altogether, then
deviations from an optimal strategy would lead to unpredicted
and possibly far worse outcomes than originally envisaged. In-
deed, there is good evidence that weighting of even potentially
irrelevant alternative outcomes plays a role in paradoxes of choice
(Allais, 1953; Loomes and Sugden, 1982; Birnbaum, 2008), with
counterfactual outcomes being represented in prefrontal cortex
(Ursu and Carter, 2005) and striatum (Lohrenz et al., 2007). An
alternative reason why an “average plan” rather than an optimal
strategy might be used is because of additional mental effort re-
quired in planning future actions. Predicted outcomes could in-
stead be sampled from the whole range of possible alternatives to
build up an average picture of whatmight transpire given current
choice. ACV far outperforms random choice, which would be an
alternative best heuristic if decision-makers were completely ig-
norant of future options. Instead, ACV explicitly models the as-
sumption that all future options are known, but that despite this
the decision-maker does not have a specific plan of their future
choices.
Although using a fixed strategymodel is possible in our task, it
is likely to dramatically fail in situations in which an individual
errs or if some planned alternatives are no longer available. An
ACV decision-maker considering all possible future outcomes is
myopic (i.e., does not deterministically plan choices in advance).
However, such a decision-maker can mitigate future errors or
constraints by weighting all possible action–outcome combina-
tions, enabling recovery from error by selecting the best set of
remaining choices without needing to assume a fixed strategy. In
other words, it makes sense that dynamic programming should
account for a decision-maker’s awareness that deviations from a
specific policy may occur in the future. One method of imple-
menting this is to optimize the average continuation value. ACV
can also partly capture decision processes in which a proportion
of (but not necessarily all) possible outcomes in a decision tree are
considered. A more informed version of the ACV model might
weight strategies according to the proportion of time that they are
expected to be chosen either according to previous experience or
based on a rational expectations model similar to quantal re-
sponse equilibriamodels of choice (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998).
We necessarily test the joint hypothesis (that bothMVS and ACV
models are true), because our continuation valuemodels are cou-
pled to a valuationmodel. Thus, although the neural data support
ACV over OCV contingent on MVS, it is possible that this could
be bettered by a combination with an alternative utility model.
We cannot draw direct statistical comparisons between utility
models in the current framework (because the models are non-
nested with different numbers of parameters), and these addi-
tional model variants remain to be tested in future work. It is
possible that we do not see neural responses corresponding to an
OCVmodel even in individuals who actually do follow this strat-
egy purely because there is no requirement for a trial-by-trial
tracking of the outcome distribution if you have preplanned a
trajectory of choices. However, the fact that we see responses
corresponding to the ACV model suggests that, at least in some
subjects, these average continuation values are being continu-
ously tracked and reevaluated.
In conclusion, we provide behavioral and neural data showing
how humans make sequential decisions, a central element in
decision-making scenarios ranging from foraging to financial in-
vestment. Our design assumes a fixed best-fitting strategy across
subjects and cannot rule out variation in strategies both between
and within subjects (i.e., switching strategies through the exper-
imental session). However, such heterogeneity would have the
effect of obscuring our ability to differentiate between models.
Rather than conforming to standard models of sequential
decision-making, our data suggest that a set of possible strategies
are neurally represented and drive choices. More generally, our
findings indicate that strategic outcomes are evaluated by similar
neural metrics as in single-shot choice, in which a behavioral
preference for higher-order features of outcome distributions is
mirrored by neural sensitivity to expected value, variance, and
skewness. Thus, it seems that phylogenetically ancient circuitry
subserving valuation and reward also enables the sophisticated
representation of the future and its alternatives.
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